Abstract
INTRODUCTION
On 14th December 2010, the EU Commission presented a Proposal, which may conveniently be referred to as the Revision Proposal [2010] , 1 for a revised version of the Brussels I Regulation. The Proposal is based on Articles 67(4) and 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and is designed to lead to the adoption of a regulation jointly by the European Parliament and the EU Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.
The Brussels I Regulation 2 may be regarded as the most important measure which has been adopted at European Union level in the sphere of private 11 The Proposal envisages that the new Regulation will become applicable 24 months and 20 days after its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
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As regards direct jurisdiction, a major change envisaged by the Revision Proposal is the assimilation of external defendants (not domiciled within the European Union) to internal defendants (domiciled within the European Union). Another important change proposed concerns the relation between jurisdiction clauses and concurrent proceedings. As regards the enforcement of judgments between Member States, the Proposal envisages the elimination of the need for a declaration of enforceability, issued by a court of the State addressed. It would also restrict the grounds on which recognition or enforcement may be refused by a court of the Member State in which recognition or enforcement is sought. Another important provision would endeavour to strengthen the effectiveness of arbitration clauses.
I. THE CURRENT REGULATION
In its original version, which is currently in force, the Brussels I Regulation consists of a Preamble, followed by 76 Articles arranged in VIII Chapters, and VI Annexes. Chapter I (Article 1) defines the material scope of the Regulation. It applies to civil or commercial matters, as distinct from public or criminal matters, but with certain exceptions, such as individual status, matrimonial property, succession on death, insolvent liquidation, and arbitration. The core of the Regulation is contained in Chapter II (Articles 2-31) on direct jurisdiction, and Chapter III (Articles 32-56), on the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Chapter II deals with direct jurisdiction, laying down rules applicable by a court of a Member State, when seised of an action on the merits, for the purpose of deciding its own jurisdiction to entertain the action. In order to strengthen the legal protection of persons established in the Community, it establishes a general rule that a defendant domiciled in a Member State must be sued in that State, and harmonises the exceptional cases in which a defendant domiciled in one Member State can be sued in another Member State. The basic rules on the Member State of a judgment on an uncontested claim, which has been given in another Member State, and certified by the court of origin as a European Enforcement Order, without the need for a declaration of enforceability to be obtained from a court of the State addressed. For the envisaged replacement of this Regulation, see Article 92(2) of the Proposal. 11 See Article 84 of the Proposal. 12 See Article 93 of the Proposal.
existence of direct jurisdiction are specified by Articles 2-4. Where the defendant is domiciled in a Member State, Article 2 confers jurisdiction to entertain actions against him on the courts of that State, and Article 3 deprives the courts of the other Member States of jurisdiction to entertain actions against him. But where the defendant is not domiciled in any of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State is referred to the law of that State. These basic rules are subject to exceptions defined by the remaining provisions of Chapter II.
Articles 5-7 derogate from Article 3 by specifying a number of cases in which they confer jurisdiction on courts of one Member State over a defendant domiciled in another Member State. In such a case the plaintiff has the choice of suing at the defendant's domicile, in accordance with Article 2, or in another Member State, in accordance with Articles 5-7. The bases of jurisdiction used by Article 5 involve a connection between the cause of action and the territory of the court on which jurisdiction is conferred. For example, as the place of performance of a relevant contractual obligation; as the place where a tortious event occurred; or as the location of a branch of the defendant undertaking, from whose operations the dispute has arisen. The bases used by Article 6 involve a connection between the claim and another claim pending in same court. It deals with co-defendants, third party proceedings, counterclaims, and related contractual and proprietary claims involving land. Article 7 deals with admiralty limitation actions. None of these provisions apply where the defendant is not domiciled in any of the Member States.
Articles 8-14, 15-17, and 18-21 lay down particular jurisdictional rules for (respectively) insurance contracts, certain consumer contracts, and employment contracts. They are based on the assumption that the policyholder, consumer or employee is in a weaker bargaining position than the insurer, supplier or employer, and thus merits special protection. Accordingly a policyholder, consumer or employee is given a choice of places in which to sue the insurer, supplier or employer. These include the policyholder or consumer's own domicile or the place where the employee habitually works. In contrast actions by the insurer, supplier or employee must usually be brought at the defendant's domicile. Except in the case of insurance of a large risk, a contrary agreement, concluded before the dispute has arisen, is usually rendered invalid. But all these provisions apply only where the defendant is domiciled in a Member State, or where the defendant insurer, supplier or employer has a branch in a Member State and the dispute has arisen from the operations of the branch.
Article 22 provides for exclusive jurisdiction over certain disputes on account of their subject-matter. For example, as regards proprietary rights to land, on the courts of the Member State in which the land in question is situated; or, as regards the validity of a patent or a registered trade mark, on the courts of the Member State in which the patent or mark was granted or registered. This provision is overriding: it applies regardless of domicile, agreement or appearance; and even where the defendant is not domiciled in any of the Member States.
Articles 23 and 24 provide for submission by agreement or appearance. Article 23 enables parties, by an express and sufficiently formal agreement, to designate a court or courts of a Member State as competent to determine disputes concerning a particular legal relationship. This freedom is restricted by Articles 13, 14, 17 and 21 in relation to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, and by Article 22 in relation to disputes which are subject to exclusive jurisdiction on account of their subject-matter. By Article 24, a court before which the defendant enters an appearance without contesting its jurisdiction becomes competent, unless the dispute falls within Article 22.
The foregoing provisions of Chapter II define the connecting factors on which the existence of jurisdiction depends. They are followed by a group of provisions concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction. Articles 25 and 26(1) require a court to decline its jurisdiction of its own motion, where it is rendered incompetent by Articles 3 or 22. Article 26(2)-(4) requires a court to stay its proceedings until appropriate steps have been taken to notify a defendant who is domiciled in another Member State. Articles 27-30 deal with the situation where similar or related proceedings are pending in courts of different Member States. They require or permit the court subsequently seised to decline jurisdiction or stay its proceedings in favour of the court first seised. Finally Article 31 enables a court to grant provisional relief even if it lacks jurisdiction to determine the substance of the dispute.
Chapter III provides for the recognition and enforcement in each Member State of judgments given by the courts of the other Member States. It seeks to establish the "free movement of judgments", by strictly limiting the grounds on which a judgment given in one Member State can be refused recognition or enforcement in another Member State, and establishing a swift procedure for obtaining a declaration of enforceability or a decision establishing recognition. In view of the harmonisation of direct jurisdiction achieved by Chapter II, a court in which recognition or enforcement is sought under Chapter III is in most cases precluded from reviewing the jurisdiction of the original court. The obligation to recognise is subject to very limited exceptions relating to public policy, insufficient service, or irreconcilability with another judgment. Only in exceptional cases is the court addressed permitted to review the jurisdiction of the original court, and it is never allowed to review the substance or merits of the judgment. A judgment which qualifies for recognition also qualifies for enforcement, provided that it is enforceable in the original country. The procedure for obtaining a declaration of enforceability is elaborated in detail, and the same procedure may be used to obtain a decision establishing recognition, though recognition may also be invoked incidentally whenever it is relevant. Chapter IV (Articles 57-58) provides for the enforcement in a Member State of authentic instruments drawn up or registered, and of court settlements approved, in other Member States.
Chapter V (Articles 59-65) lays down rules for the determination of domicile for the purpose of the Regulation. By Article 59, whether an individual is domiciled in a Member State is governed by the law of that State. By Article 60, corporate domicile is given a substantive definition, referring alternatively to the registered office, central administration, and principal place of business. Chapter V also incorporates a miscellany of minor supplementary or exceptional provisions. Chapter VI (Article 66) contains transitional provisions. Chapter VII (Articles 67-72) deals with the relationship between the Regulation and other Community legislation or international conventions. Chapter VIII (Articles 73-76) deals with entry into force and amendments. The Annexes to the Regulation contain lists of relevant national legislation, rules, courts and procedures, and standard forms for use in connection with enforcement.
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II. EXTERNAL RELATIONS
A. External Defendants
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Chapter II effects a thorough harmonisation of the bases of jurisdiction over a defendant who is domiciled within the European Union. But in the case of a defendant who is not so domiciled (and who may be conveniently be referred to as an external defendant), Article 4 of the Regulation remits the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State to the law of the forum State. Even the excessive bases of jurisdiction contained in the lex fori (such as the defendant's nationality or transient presence; the plaintiff's nationality, domicile or residence; or the location of property unconnected with the dispute) are available against an external defendant.
14 On the other hand, the ordinary bases envisaged by Articles 5 and 6 (which refer to such factors as the place of performance of a contractual obligation, the place where a tortious event occurred, or the domicile of a co-defendant) are available against an external defendant only if the lex fori so provides.
By way of exception, Article 4 gives way to Article 22 (on exclusive jurisdiction by reason of subject-matter), Article 23 (on jurisdiction clauses), 15 Article 24 (on submission by appearance), 16 and Articles 27-30 (on concurrent proceedings in courts of different Member States). 17 In addition, in the context of an insurance contract, a protected consumer contract, or an employment contract, a defendant who is an insurer, a supplier or an employer, and who is not domiciled in any Member State but has a branch, situated in a Member State, from the operations of which the dispute has arisen, is treated as domiciled in the State in which the branch is situated.
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One of the major features of the Revision Proposal is the assimilation of defendants who are not domiciled within the European Union to defendants who are domiciled in a Member State other than the forum State. The current Article 4 would be deleted, and a new Article 4(4) would specify that persons not domiciled in any of the Member States may be sued in the courts of a Member State only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 8 of Chapter II. Articles 5 and 6 would no longer be confined to defendants who are domiciled in a Member State other than the forum State, and similar amendments would be made to Articles 8, 9, 15, 18 and 19. Article 23, on jurisdiction clauses, would become fully operative, even where none of the parties is domiciled within the European Union. Thus, for the purpose of English jurisdiction, a defendant domiciled in Turkey would be treated in the same way as a defendant domiciled in France. In this way the arbitrary discrimination, which currently exists under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, between defendants domiciled within the European Union and defendants not so domiciled, would be eliminated, along with the underlying assumption that courts outside the European Union cannot be trusted to provide justice. Member State where property belonging to the defendant was located, provided that the value of the property was not disproportionate to the value of the claim, and that the dispute had a sufficient connection with the forum State. It may be observed that no connection between the property in question and the subjectmatter of the dispute is required, and that the concept of a "sufficient" connection with the forum State could hardly be less precise.
Secondly, a new Article 26 would apply where otherwise no court of a Member State would have jurisdiction under the Regulation. It would permit the courts of a Member State, on an exceptional basis, to hear a case if the right to a fair trial or the right to access to justice so required, and if in addition the dispute had a sufficient connection with the forum State. The application of this provision is explicitly contemplated where, for example, proceedings could not reasonably be brought or conducted or would be impossible in an external country with which the dispute was closely connected; or where a judgment given on the claim in an external country would not be entitled to recognition and enforcement in the forum State under its law, and such recognition and enforcement was necessary to ensure that the rights of the claimant were satisfied. Again, the concept of a "sufficient" connection with the forum State could hardly be less precise.
The proposed amendments relating to external defendants may give rise to controversy. Within the Parliament, the Zwiefka Report proposes to delete the new provisions assimilating external defendants to internal defendants, on the ground that they are premature and require wide-ranging consultations and political debate.
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In contrast, to the present writer, the Commission's proposals in this respect merit an unqualified welcome. They eliminate the existing arbitrary discrimination against external defendants, present a more co-operative appearance to the wider world, and increase certainty and predictability within the European Union. But the additional grounds, to be made available against external defendants by the new Articles 25-26, could usefully be clarified.
B. External Concurrent Proceedings
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Articles 27-30 deal with the problem of concurrent proceedings in different countries in respect of similar or related claims, but these provisions are confined to cases where each of the concurrent proceedings is in a court of an EU Member State.
Article 27 deals with similar claims, which involve the same cause of action and are between the same parties. 20 Article 27(1) requires the court subsequently seised to stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. When the jurisdiction of the court first seised has been established, Article 27(2) requires the court subsequently seised to decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised. Although there is no ruling on the point from the European Court, national case-law indicates that Article 27 does not impliedly permit a Member State to extend its operation, reflexively or analogistically, so as to give similar effect to a proceeding commenced earlier in a court of an external country.
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The Revision Proposal would introduce a new Article 34, which would enable a court of a Member State, in its discretion, to stay its proceedings in favour of an earlier proceeding in a court of an external country. This addition has the support of the Zwiefka Report, 22 and is welcomed by the present writer, as reflecting (along with the assimilation of external to internal defendants) a more co-operative attitude towards the wider world.
By the new Article 34(1), the discretion would be available where proceedings in relation to the same cause of action and between the same parties were pending before the courts of an external country at a time when a court in a Member State was seised. Then the court of the Member State would be permitted to stay its proceedings if: (a) the external court was seised first in time; (b) it could be expected that the external court would, within a reasonable time, render a judgment which would be capable of recognition and, where applicable, enforcement in the Member State; and (c) the court was satisfied that it was necessary for the proper administration of justice to do so.
The new Article 34(2) would add that, during the period of the stay, the party who had seised the court in the Member State would not lose the benefit of interruption of prescription or limitation periods provided for under the law of the Member State. The new Article 34(3) would permit the internal court to discharge the stay at any time, upon application by either party or of its own motion, if one of the following conditions were met: (a) the proceedings in the external court were themselves stayed or were discontinued; or (b) it appeared to the internal court that the proceedings in the external court were unlikely to 20 On the same cause of actions and the same parties, see notes 33 and 34 infra. Article 27 is supplemented by Article 28, which deals with dissimilar but related claims, and confers discretion on the court subsequently seised to stay its proceedings or decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised. be concluded within a reasonable time; or (c) discharge of the stay was required for the proper administration of justice.
By the new Article 34(4), the internal court would be required to dismiss its proceedings, upon application by either party or of its own motion, if the proceedings in the external court were concluded and had resulted in a judgment which was enforceable in the external country, or was capable of recognition and, where applicable, enforcement in the Member State. The last "or" seems to be a slip, since it is obvious that the effectiveness of the judgment in both countries is intended to be required.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONAL CHANGES
A. Proprietary Rights in Moveable Property
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 5 specifies a number of cases in which it confers jurisdiction on a ground which involves a connection between the subject-matter of the claim and the forum territory. These grounds refer to such factors as the place of performance of a relevant contractual obligation; the place where a tortious event occurred; or the location of a branch of the defendant undertaking from the operations of which the dispute has arisen. But, except as regards salvage claims against a cargo or freight, which are dealt with by Article 5(7), none of the grounds utilised by Article 5 refers to the location of moveable property to which the dispute relates. In the Revision Proposal, this lacuna is addressed by the new Article 5(3), which would confer jurisdiction, as regards rights in rem in or possession of moveable property, on the courts for the place where the property is situated.
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B. Third-party Proceedings
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 6 specifies a number of cases in which it confers ancillary jurisdiction, so as to extend the jurisdiction of a court which is properly seised of one claim by enabling it also to determine a related claim. It deals with co-defendants, third parties, counterclaims, and related contractual and proprietary claims to land. As regards third-party proceedings, Article 65 makes further provision, designed to adapt Article 6(2), in view of the limited character which such proceedings have in Germany, Austria and Hungary. The Revision Proposal, by Article 76 and Annex VIII, would extend the scope of the adaptation to cover the similarly limited character of such proceedings in Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. This extension would accord with the Lugano Convention 2007.
C. Employment
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Sections 3-5 (Articles 8-14, 15-17, and 18-21) of Chapter II provide special rules on jurisdiction over disputes relating to insurance contracts, certain consumer contracts, and individual contracts of employment. These are designed to give additional protection to policyholders, consumers and employees, in view of their economic weakness and legal inexperience.
As regards employment, in the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Articles 19 enables an employee to bring an action against his employer at the employer's domicile; or at the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or the last place where he did so; or, where the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, at the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated. In contrast, Article 20 requires that an action by an employer against his employee must normally be brought at the employee's domicile. Moreover contrary agreements are in general invalidated by Article 21.
In the Revision Proposal, the reference in Article 18 to the place where the employee habitually carries out his work (or the last place where he did so) would be slightly amended, so as to refer to the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work (or the last place where he did so). This seems designed to reflect the existing case-law of the European Court, which refers to the place where the employee has established the effective centre of his working activities, at or from which he performs the essential part of his duties towards his employer, 24 and to bring the wording of Article 18 into line with that used for choice-of-law purposes by Article 8(2) of the Rome I Regulation.
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More importantly, the Revision Proposal would add to Article 18(1) of the Brussels I Regulation a saving in favour of Article 6(1), on co-defendants. This would overrule the decision of the European Court in Glaxosmithkline v. Rouard 26 that, in view of the exhaustive character of Section 5, an employee who is jointly employed by two employers who are domiciled in different Member States cannot utilise Article 6(1) so as sue both employers at the domicile of one of them. Thus where, as in that case, an employee is jointly employed by two companies belonging to the same group, one of which is domiciled in France and the other in the United Kingdom, but his place of habitual work is outside Europe, there is no court within the Member States in which he can sue both companies for unfair or wrongful dismissal. It may be noted that the effect of the contemplated amendment would not only be to enable an employee with joint employers to sue both employers at the domicile of either of the employers, but also to enable an employer who had related claims against several of his employees to sue all such employees at the domicile of any one of them.
The Revision Proposal also contains a new Article 85, which specifies that the Regulation is not to affect the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, to engage in collective action to protect their interests, in particular the right or freedom to strike or to take other actions, in accordance with EU law and national law and practices. The Zwiefka Report would, by its Amendment 56, delete this provision, as lacking justification in the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum. Indeed, one may regard its rationale as narrowly political, and its likely effect as merely decorative.
D. Tenancies
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 22 of the provides for exclusive jurisdiction over certain proceedings by reason of their principal subject-matter. It applies to proceedings principally concerned with rights in rem in or tenancies of land; certain matters governed by company law; the validity of entries in public registers; the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights; or the enforcement of judgments. The rules laid down by Article 22 are overriding in character. They apply regardless of domicile, appearance, or contrary agreement between the parties to the dispute. 27 A court seised contrary to Article 22 must decline jurisdiction of its own motion, 28 and a judgment given in contravention of Article 22 must be refused recognition and enforcement in the other Member States.
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Article 22(1) applies to proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immoveable property or tenancies of immoveable property, and confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of the Member State in which the property is situated. It makes an exception for proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immoveable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, where the tenant is an individual (rather than a corporate entity) and the landlord and the tenant are domiciled in the same Member State. In such a case exclusive jurisdiction is shared by the courts of the location of the property and those of the defendant's domicile. The Revision Proposal 2010 would clarify the exception for short tenancies by specifying that the common domicile may exist either at the conclusion of the agreement or at the institution of proceedings.
The Revision Proposal would also add a further exception, to be contained in a new Article 22(1)(b), which would specify that, in agreements concerning tenancies of premises for professional use, parties may agree that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction in accordance with Article 23. Thus jurisdictional clauses would be rendered effective in relation to tenancies of business premises.
E. Jurisdiction Clauses
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 23 deals with jurisdiction clauses. It enables parties to agree that a court or the courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, with the result that the chosen court or courts have jurisdiction, and that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. It also specifies the formal requirements (such as conclusion or evidence in writing; or compliance with international commercial usages) to which such an agreement is subject. But it does not specify the substantive requirements for such an agreement, in relation to such factors as fraud, mistake, or improper pressure.
The Revision Proposal seeks to fill this lacuna by specifying that the agreement must not be null and void as to its substance under the law of the Member State whose court or courts are chosen. The Zwiefka Report, by its Amendments 19-20, suggests a more complicated rule of alternative reference, whereby substantive validity could also be achieved by compliance with the law chosen by the parties to govern the agreement on jurisdiction, or (in the absence of such a choice of law) with the law applicable to the contract of which the agreement on jurisdiction forms a part, or (in all other cases) with the law applicable to the legal relationship from which the dispute between the parties arose.
The Zwiefka Report, by its Amendment 21, would also add a provision specifying that an agreement conferring jurisdiction which forms part of a contract is to be regarded as an agreement distinct from the other clauses of the contract; and is not to be affected by the nullity, the non-existence, the lapsing, the termination or the determination or any other cause of ineffectiveness of the contract. This would reflect the ruling of the European Court in Benincasa v. Dentalkit.
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Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, a jurisdiction clause has full effect, both positively, in conferring jurisdiction on the chosen court or courts, and negatively, in excluding the jurisdiction of other courts of Member States, where at least one of the parties to the agreement is domiciled in a Member State. But where none of the parties is domiciled in any of the Member States, Articles 4 and 23 (3) same parties. 33 Article 27(1) requires the court subsequently seised to stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, Article 27(2) requires the court subsequently seised to decline jurisdiction in favour of the court first seised.
The Revision Proposal would renumber Article 27 as Article 29, and insert a new Article 29(2), requiring the court first seised to establish its jurisdiction within six months, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible. It would also require the court first seised, upon request by any other court seised of the dispute, to inform the other court of the date on which it was seised, and of whether it had established jurisdiction over the dispute or, failing that, of the estimated time for establishing jurisdiction. This addition seems to merit an unqualified welcome.
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 28 deals with related claims. These are defined by Article 28(3) as ones which are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member States, Article 28(1) confers on the court subsequently seised a discretion to stay its proceedings. By Article 28(2), where related actions are pending at first instance, the court subsequently seised is given discretion to decline jurisdiction, if a party so applies, and the court first seised has jurisdiction over both actions, and the law of the country of the first court permits their consolidation.
The Revision Proposal would renumber Article 28 as Article 30, and would amend the second paragraph so as to require only the first action (rather than both actions) to be pending at first instance. This no doubt reflects the idea that, so long as the first action is still pending at first instance, consolidation will not deprive a party of a level of jurisdiction. 34 The Proposal also deletes from the second paragraph the requirement that consolidation should be possible. The rationale for the last-mentioned change is not clear.
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, the time at which a court is seised of an action for the purpose of Articles 27-29 is governed by Article 30. By Article 30(1), a court is regarded as seised at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant. By Article 30(2), if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court, the court is regarded as seised at the time when the document is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court.
The Revision Proposal would renumber Article 30 (1)- (2) as Article 33(1)(a)-(b), and would add that for this purpose the first authority receiving the documents to be served would count as the authority responsible for service. It would also add an Article 33(2), requiring the courts and authorities responsible for service to note the date and time of the lodging of the document instituting proceedings or of the receipt of the documents to be served.
G. Jurisdiction Clauses and Concurrent Proceedings
As the European Court made clear in Gasser v. MISAT, 35 under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 23, on jurisdiction clauses, gives way to Article 27, on concurrent proceedings in respect of similar claims. Thus if one party brings an action in defiance of a jurisdiction clause, and then the other party brings an action elsewhere in respect of the same matter in accordance with the clause, it is for the court seised of the first action to determine the meaning, validity and effect of the clause, and to determine its own jurisdiction accordingly. The court subsequently seised must stay its proceedings to await the decision of the first court on its jurisdiction, and then decline jurisdiction if the first court accepts jurisdiction.
The Revision Proposal seeks to give control to the court on which a jurisdiction clause is alleged to confer jurisdiction. Thus its Recital 19 explains that the effectiveness of choice of court agreements should be improved in order to give full effect to the will of the parties and avoid abusive litigation tactics, and that the Regulation should therefore grant priority to the court designated in the agreement to decide on its jurisdiction, regardless of whether it is first or second seised. The Commission's Explanatory Memorandum 36 adds that any other court will have to stay proceedings until the chosen court has established or, in case the agreement is invalid, declined jurisdiction. It claims that this modification will increase the effectiveness of choice of court agreements and eliminate the incentives for abusive litigation in non-competent courts.
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However the text of the Proposal seems ill-designed to achieve this. A new Article 32(2) specifies:
With the exception of agreements governed by Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this Chapter, where an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 confers exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the courts of a Member State, the courts of other Member States shall have no jurisdiction over the dispute until such time as the court or courts designated in the agreement decline their jurisdiction.
The exception for Sections 3-5 relates to insurance, consumer and employment contracts. The reference to Article 32(1) is evidently a slip, Article 23(1) being intended. But the wording seems inadequate to prevent a court, faced with an alleged agreement on jurisdiction choosing a court elsewhere, from assessing the validity of the agreement under Article 23, and concluding that the alleged agreement is for some reason non-existent, invalid or inoperative. Since its conclusion would be that there was no "agreement referred to in [Article 23(1)] confer[ring] exclusive jurisdiction to a court or the courts of [another] Member State", the new Article 32(2) would not apply, and the court could then proceed to assume jurisdiction over the dispute under some other provision of Chapter II.
But even if the drafting of the new Article 32(2) is improved, or the matter is dealt with by amending the existing Article 27 (on concurrent proceedings in respect of similar claims), it is difficult to see merit in the change envisaged. As the European Court in substance recognised in Gasser v. MISAT, 38 there is no good reason to presume the existence, validity or scope of an alleged jurisdiction clause, or to give an invalid clause the effect of temporarily blocking the jurisdiction of an otherwise competent court. Other proposed changes, designed to require a court to reach a prompt decision as to its own jurisdiction, should be sufficient to prevent serious abuses.
H. Appearance
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 24 confers jurisdiction on a court of a Member State before which a defendant enters an 37 See also Explanatory Statement to the Zwiefka Report, which accepts that the enhancement of the effectiveness of choice-of-court agreements by stipulating that the court chosen by the parties to resolve their dispute should always have priority, regardless of whether it was first or second seised, seems to be a viable solution. appearance, except where appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of subject-matter under Article 22.
Under the Revision Proposal, Article 24 would become Article 24(1). The Proposal would add a new Article 24(2), which would be limited to disputes concerning insurance contracts, protected consumer contracts and employment contracts. In such cases, the instituting or equivalent document would have to contain information for the defendant on his right to contest the jurisdiction of the court and the consequences of entering an appearance; and, before assuming jurisdiction on the basis of appearance, the court would have to ensure that such information had been provided to the defendant.
I. Provisional Measures
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 31 enables application to be made to the courts of a Member State for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if under the Regulation the courts of another Member State have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. This provision confers an additional jurisdiction, limited to provisional measures. of that State, even if the courts of another State or an arbitral tribunal have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. This would extend the power to cases where the substantive proceedings are to take place in a court of an external country, and confirm that it applies where the substantive proceedings are to take place in an arbitral tribunal.
On the other hand, the European Court emphasised in Reichert v. Dresdner Bank (No 2) 42 and St Paul Dairy Industries v. Unibel Exser 43 that the current Article 31 is intended to avoid losses to the parties resulting from the long delays inherent in international proceedings, and is confined to measures which are intended to preserve a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard rights whose recognition is sought elsewhere from the court having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. Thus, as the Court ruled in Reichert, Article 31 does not extend to an application by a creditor, whereby he seeks to obtain the revocation in regard to him of a transfer of property effected by his debtor in fraud of his rights, since its purpose is to vary the legal situation of the debtor's assets and of the transferee by ordering revocation of the disposition. Similarly, as the Court ruled in St Paul, Article 31 does not extend to an application for a measure ordering the hearing of a witness before substantive proceedings are initiated, for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case, to determine whether it would be well founded, and to assess the relevance of evidence which might be adduced.
In the Revision Proposal, Article 2(b) would specify that provisional (including protective) measures are to include protective orders aimed at obtaining information and evidence. This might appear to overrule the decision in St Paul, but Recital 22 indicates that it is designed to cover search and seizure orders, but not measures ordering the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case. does not constitute a provisional measure within Article 31 unless (firstly) repayment to the defendant of the sum awarded is guaranteed if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as regards the substance of his claim, and (secondly) the measure sought relates only to specific assets of the defendant located or to be located within the territory of the forum State.
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In Mietz v. Intership Yachting Sneek, 48 the European Court went further and created an additional exception to the general rule under Chapter III of the Regulation which prevents review of the jurisdiction of the court of origin by the court addressed, in order to prevent the abuse of Article 31 from undermining the scheme of Chapter II. It emphasised the importance of ensuring that enforcement under Chapter III in another Member State of provisional or protective measures allegedly founded on the jurisdiction laid down in Article 31, but which go beyond the limits of that jurisdiction, does not result in circumvention of the rules on substantive jurisdiction set out in Chapter II. For the jurisdiction recognised by Article 31 constitutes, within the context of the Regulation, a special regime. Thus enforcement under Chapter III must be refused where: (i) the judgment was delivered at the end of proceedings which were not, by their very nature, proceedings as to substance, but summary proceedings for the granting of interim measures; (ii) the measure ordered (such as an unconditional interim payment) is not a provisional or protective measure permissible under Article 31; and (iii) the original court had either expressly indicated in its judgment that it had based its jurisdiction on Article 31, or had been silent as to the basis of its jurisdiction.
The Revision Proposal would also add a new Article 31, which would apply where substantive proceedings are pending before a court of one Member State, and the courts of another Member State are seised with an application for provisional (including protective) measures. It would then require the courts concerned to cooperate in order to ensure proper coordination between the substantive proceedings and the provisional relief. In particular, it would require the court seised with the application for provisional measures to seek information from the other court on all relevant circumstances of the case, such as the urgency of the measure sought or any refusal of a similar measure by the court seised as to the substance.
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, the European Court has established that Chapter III extends to provisional orders (for example, an order freezing the defendant's assets, or establishing an admiralty limitation fund), except for orders which were made without summoning a party, which were intended to be enforced without prior service on the party, and which could not be subsequently challenged by the party in adversary proceedings before the issue of its recognition or enforcement under the Regulation came to be addressed. Thus it ruled in Denilauler v. Couchet Frères 49 that a provisional order which is made without the defendant having been summoned to appear and is intended to be enforced without prior service on him is not enforceable in other Member States under Chapter III of the Regulation. This exception was however narrowed by the Court's subsequent decision in Maersk Olie & Gas v. de Haan & de Boer, 50 where it explained that Chapter III extends to decisions taken at the conclusion of an initial phase of the proceedings in which both parties were not heard, provided that the order could have been the subject of submissions by both parties before the issue of its recognition or enforcement under the Regulation came to be addressed. Similarly in Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler, 51 the European Court explained that, for judgments to fall within the scope of the Regulation, it is sufficient that they are judicial decisions which, before their recognition and enforcement are sought in another Member State, have been, or have been capable of being, in the State of origin and under various procedures, the subject of an inquiry in adversary proceedings.
The Revision Proposal would specifically prevent the recognition and enforcement in another Member State under Chapter III of a provisional measure adopted by a court which lacked substantive jurisdiction. 52 But it would confirm the recognition and enforcement of a provisional measure adopted by a court which had substantive jurisdiction, subject to the existing saving for certain ex parte judgments. Thus a new Article 2(a) would specify that, for the purposes of Chapter III, the term "judgment" includes provisional (including protective) measures ordered by a court which by virtue of the Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter; and that it also includes measures ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear and which are intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant, if the defendant has the right to challenge the measure subsequently under the law of the Member State of origin. A new Article 42(2)(i) would require an applicant for enforcement in another Member State of a judgment ordering a provisional measure to provide the competent enforcement authorities with a certificate in the form set out in Annex I, issued by the court of origin, containing a description of the measure and certifying that the court had jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. By a new Article 42 (2) 52 In this connection, the Explanatory Memorandum, para. 3.1.5, refers to the wide divergence of national law on this issue, and the risk of abusive forum-shopping.
would also be necessary, where the measure had been ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear and was intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant, for the certificate issued by the court of origin to certify that the defendant had the right to challenge the measure under the law of the Member State of origin.
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IV. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
A. The current position
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Chapter III (Articles 32-56) regulates the recognition and enforcement in each Member State of judgments given by the courts of the other Member States. Chapter III provides for both the recognition and the enforcement of judgments. It both defines the substantive conditions for granting recognition or enforcement, and specifies the procedure for obtaining recognition or enforcement.
The basic principle, laid down by Articles 33 and 38 of the Brussels I Regulation, is that a judgment to which Chapter III applies must be recognised and enforced in the other Member States. The principle is reinforced by Articles 36 and 45(2), which emphasise that in no circumstances may the court addressed review the substance or merits of the judgment; and by Article 35(3), which in most cases prevents the court addressed from reviewing the jurisdiction of the original court. A very limited range of exceptions, in which recognition and enforcement must be refused, are specified by Articles 34-35 and 45(1). These exceptions relate to judgments whose recognition is incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed; default judgments where the defendant was not served with the originating document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence; judgments which are irreconcilable with other judgments; and, in a very limited range of situations, judgments given in proceedings over which the original court lacked jurisdiction.
Recognition of a judgment implies that the judgment is treated as conclusive of the matters which it determined. Enforcement of a judgment implies that the judgment ordered something to be done (such as the payment of a sum of money or the actual performance of a contract) or not to be done (as in the case of an injunction prohibiting the commission of an act which would constitute a breach of contract or a tort), and that steps of an official nature are taken with a view to ensuring that the order is complied with. Under Chapter III, the same substantive conditions apply to both recognition and enforcement, except that for enforcement there is an additional requirement that the judgment should be enforceable in the original country.
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The procedure for obtaining enforcement is elaborated in detail by Articles 38-56. It involves an ex parte application for a declaration of enforceability to a court of the State addressed, on which an immediate decision must be given. The decision on the initial application is subject to an appeal inter partes, and the decision on the appeal to a single further appeal on a point of law. The unified procedure leads to the making of a declaration of enforceability, and once this is obtained the actual measures of enforcement are governed mainly by the law of the State addressed. An ex parte declaration of enforceability enables the applicant to take protective measures against the respondent's property, but definitive enforcement is delayed until the appeal inter partes has become time-barred or has been disposed of.
As regards mere recognition (without enforcement), Article 33 (1) and (3) provide that no special procedure is required, and that recognition may be sought incidentally in any proceedings in which it is relevant. Alternatively, by Article 33(2), an interested party may use the enforcement procedure laid down in Articles 38-56 to apply for a decision establishing recognition. But this procedure is not made available to a party who seeks a decision establishing non-recognition.
B. Definition of a Judgment
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 32 defines a "judgment" as one given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, and adds that it is immaterial what the judgment may be called (such as a decree, order, decision, or writ of execution), and that a determination of costs or expenses by a court officer is included. , that it is enough that the judgment is in formal terms enforceable in character, as where it bears a formal order for enforcement, even if it can no longer be enforced in the original country because of some subsequent development, such as payment of the debt or the debtor's bankruptcy. 55 The European Court has established that Chapter III extends to default judgments, including ones given against a defendant who has entered an appearance but has been excluded from the proceedings by reason of his failure to comply with disclosure orders, though such exclusion may be relevant under the public policy exception to In the Revision Proposal, the current Article 32 would be replaced by a new Article 2(a), defining a "judgment" as any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court. A new Article 2(c) would add that "court" includes any authorities designated by a Member State as having jurisdiction in the matters falling within the scope of the Regulation.
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, the European Court has established that Chapter III extends to provisional orders (for example, an order freezing the defendant's assets, or establishing an admiralty limitation fund), except for orders which were made without summoning a party, which were intended to be enforced without prior service on the party, and which could not be subsequently challenged by the party in adversary proceedings before the issue of its recognition or enforcement under the Regulation came to be addressed. 56 The European Court has also created an additional exception to the general rule under Chapter III of the Regulation which prevents review of the jurisdiction of the court of origin by the court addressed, in order to prevent the abuse of Article 31 from undermining the scheme of Chapter II. Thus enforcement under Chapter III must be refused where: (i) the judgment was delivered at the end of proceedings which were not, by their very nature, proceedings as to substance, but summary proceedings for the granting of interim measures; (ii) the measure ordered (such as an unconditional interim payment) is not a provisional or protective measure permissible under Article 31; and (iii) the original court had either expressly indicated in its judgment that it had based its jurisdiction on Article 31, or had been silent as to the basis of its jurisdiction.
57
In the Revision Proposal, the new Article 2(a) would specify that, for the purposes of Chapter III, the term "judgment" includes provisional (including protective) measures ordered by a court which by virtue of the Regulation has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter; and that it also includes measures ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, and which are intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant, if the defendant has the right to challenge the measure subsequently under the law of the Member State of origin. information and evidence, but Recital 22 indicates that this is designed to cover search and seizure orders, but not measures ordering the hearing of a witness for the purpose of enabling the applicant to decide whether to bring a case.
In addition, a new Article 42(2)(i) would require an applicant for enforcement in another Member State of a judgment ordering a provisional measure to provide the competent enforcement authorities with a certificate, in the form set out in Annex I, issued by the court of origin, containing a description of the measure and certifying that the court had jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. By a new Article 42(2)(ii), it would also be necessary, where the measure had been ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, and was intended to be enforced without prior service of the defendant, for the certificate issued by the court of origin to certify that the defendant had the right to challenge the measure under the law of the Member State of origin.
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Thus the effect of the Revision Proposal of 2010 would be to prevent the recognition and enforcement in another Member State under Chapter III of a provisional measure adopted by a court which lacked substantive jurisdiction.
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But it would confirm the recognition and enforcement of a provisional measure adopted by a court which had substantive jurisdiction, subject to the existing saving for certain ex parte judgments.
C. The Abolition of Exequatur
A major change introduced by the Revision Proposal of 2010 is the abolition, in the context of the enforcement of judgments, of the need for a declaration of enforceability (or exequatur) in the Member State addressed. Thus the new Article 38(1) would require that, save as otherwise provided by Chapter III, a judgment given in a Member State must be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required and without any possibility of opposing its recognition; and the new Article 38(2) would insist that a judgment given in one Member State which is enforceable in that State must be enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability.
The rationale for this change is explained by Recital 23, which asserts that mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union, and the aim of making cross-border litigation less time-consuming and costly, justify the abolition of the existing intermediate measures to be taken prior to enforcement 58 See also Explanatory Memorandum, para 3.1.5. 59 In this connection, the Explanatory Memorandum, para 3.1.5, refers to the wide divergence of national law on this issue, and the risk of abusive forum shopping. in the Member State in which enforcement is sought. The intended result is that a judgment given by a court of a Member State should, for enforcement purposes, be treated as if it had been delivered in the Member State in which enforcement is sought.
The abolition of exequatur would apply to all judgments within the scope of the Regulation, with two exceptions. The first exception would relate to judgments which deal with claims concerning defamation or privacy. The second exception would apply to certain judgments given in collective proceedings in respect of claims for compensation. In the two exceptional cases, a procedure for obtaining recognition and enforcement, similar to the procedure currently applicable under the Brussels I Regulation, would be retained. 60 Thus, apart from the two minor exceptions, the well-established procedure under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation would be abolished. 61 To the present writer, the proposed abolition of the need for an enforcement order seems misconceived. There is a well-established procedure for enforcement, which appears to be working well. Its elimination will either cause confusion to officials involved in enforcement, or will give rise to new and unharmonised procedures before courts. In either case, difficulties and delays in enforcement seems likely to be increased rather than diminished.
As regards mere recognition, the new Article 39(1) would require a party who wished to invoke in another Member State a judgment recognised under Article 38(1) to produce a copy of the judgment which satisfied the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity. The new Article 39(2) would permit the court before which the recognised judgment was invoked, where necessary, to request the party invoking it to produce a certificate issued by the court of origin, using the form set out in Annex I of the Regulation, and to provide a transliteration or a translation of the contents of the form. It would also require the court of origin to issue such a certificate at the request of any interested party. The new Article 39(3) would permit the court before which the recognised judgment was invoked to suspend its proceedings, in whole or in part, if the judgment were challenged in the Member State of origin, or in the event of an application for a review pursuant to Articles 45 or 46.
As regards enforcement, the new Article 40 would insist that an enforceable judgment would carry with it by operation of law the power to proceed to any protective measures which existed under the law of the Member State of 60 See Section IV.C.1 infra. 61 The Zwiefka Report supports the proposed abolition of exequatur, but would delete the proposed exclusions of privacy and defamation and of collective proceedings from the abolition. enforcement. By the new Article 41(1), in general the procedure for the enforcement of judgments given in another Member State would be governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement; but a judgment given in a Member State which was enforceable in the Member State of enforcement would have to be enforced there under the same conditions as a local judgment. However, by the new Article 41(2), the grounds of refusal or suspension of enforcement under the law of the Member State of enforcement would not apply in so far as they concerned situations referred to in Articles 43 to 46.
By the new Article 42(1), in the case of a judgment other than one ordering a provisional measure, the applicant for enforcement would have to provide the competent enforcement authorities with: (a) a copy of the judgment which satisfied the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity; and (b) a certificate in the form set out in Annex I, issued by the court of origin, certifying that the judgment was enforceable, and containing, where appropriate, an extract of the judgment, as well as relevant information on the recoverable costs of the proceedings and the calculation of interest.
By the new Article 42(2), in the case of a judgment ordering a provisional measure, the applicant for enforcement would have to provide the competent enforcement authorities with: (a) a copy of the judgment which satisfied the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity; and (b) the certificate in the form set out in Annex I, issued by the court of origin, containing a description of the measure, and certifying (i) that the court had jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter; and (ii) where the measure was ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, and was intended to be enforced without prior service on the defendant, that the defendant had the right to challenge the measure under the law of the Member State of origin.
Whether the judgment was an ordinary judgment or one ordering a provisional measure, the new Article 42(3) would permit the competent authority, where necessary, to request a transliteration or a translation of the content of the form issued under Annex I. But the new Article 42(4) would prevent the competent authorities from requiring the applicant to provide a translation of the judgment itself, unless the enforcement of the judgment was challenged and a translation appeared necessary. By the new Article 65, a party seeking the recognition, enforceability or enforcement of a judgment given in another Member State would not be required to have a postal address or an authorised representative in the Member State of enforcement.
By the new Article 66, if a judgment contained a measure or an order which was not known in the Member State of enforcement, the competent authority there would be required, to the extent possible, to adapt the measure, or to order one known under its own law which had equivalent effects and pursued similar aims and interests. This is a new provision, and seems capable of giving rise to some difficulty in its application.
By the new Article 67, a judgment given in a Member State which ordered a payment by way of a penalty would be enforceable in the Member State of enforcement in accordance with the new Regulation. The competent court or authority in the Member State of enforcement would determine the amount of the payment if that amount had not been finally determined by the courts of the Member State of origin. This would replace Article 49 of the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, by which a foreign judgment which orders a periodic payment by way of a penalty is enforceable in the Member State addressed only if the amount of the payment has been finally determined by the courts of the Member State of origin.
The abolition of exequatur envisaged by the Revision Proposal would apply to all judgments within the scope of the Regulation, with two exceptions. In the two exceptional cases, a procedure similar to the current procedure for recognition and enforcement would be maintained.
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The first exception would apply to judgments which deal with claims for defamation or invasion of privacy. Thus Article 37(3)(a) refers to judgments concerning non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation. Recital 23 indicates that the scope of this provision should correspond to that of the similar exclusion from the Rome II Regulation, 63 and should be interpreted in the same way.
The second exception would apply to certain judgments given in collective proceedings in respect of claims for compensation. Thus Article 37(3)(b) of the Proposal refers to judgments given in proceedings which concern the compensation of harm caused by unlawful business practices to a multitude of injured parties. But Article 37(3)(b) also confines the exception to judgments given in proceedings brought by a state body; or brought by a non-profitmaking organisation whose main purpose and activity is to represent and defend the interests of groups of natural or legal persons, other than by (on a commercial basis) providing them with legal advice or representing them in court; or brought by a group of more than fifteen claimants. 62 The Zwiefka Report supports the proposed abolition of exequatur, but would delete the proposed exclusions of privacy and defamation and of collective proceedings from the abolition. 63 EC Regulation 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations; [2007] OJ L199/40. See Article 1(2)(g) thereof, which refers to non-contractual obligations arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation.
Recital 23 to the Proposal justifies these exceptions by reference to the divergences between Member States' systems in regard to these matters, and their particular sensitivity. In connection with defamation and privacy, the EU Commission's Explanatory Memorandum 64 refers also to the absence of a harmonised choice-of-law rule at European Union level. As regards collective proceedings, the Memorandum refers to differences between national laws as to the scope of such proceedings; legal standing to bring them; relevant categories of victim; persons bound; time of identification of victims; funding; distribution of proceeds; and the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Accordingly, in order to retain the existing regime for the two exceptional cases, Section 2 (Articles 47-63) of Chapter III of the Proposal contains provisions which broadly echo Articles 33-52 of the original version of the Brussels I Regulation. However the existing Article 35, which provides for jurisdictional review in certain exceptional cases, would not be retained. Jurisdictional review would be eliminated, except that it would remain available under Article 83 in accordance with a convention, concluded before the entry into force of the Brussels I Regulation, between the State addressed and an external country. The requirement by the existing Article 40 that the applicant for enforcement must give an address for service of process in the State addressed, or appoint a representative ad litem, would also be deleted. Moreover the powers of the court addressed to stay its proceeding by reason of an appeal in the country of origin would be restricted by the new Articles 49 and 59 to cases where the enforceability of the decision was suspended in the Member State of origin by reason of an appeal. Time-limits for appealing against a declaration of enforceability, and for disposal of such an appeal, would be tightened by the new Articles 56 and 58.
D. Exceptions to Recognition and Enforcement
The Current Position
Under the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, the basic principle, laid down by Articles 33 and 38, is that a judgment to which Chapter III applies must be recognised and enforced in the other Member States. The principle is reinforced by Articles 36 and 45(2), which emphasise that in no circumstances may the court addressed review the substance (the merits) of the judgment; and by Article 35(3), which in most cases prevents the court addressed from reviewing the jurisdiction of the original court. A very limited range of exceptions, in which recognition and enforcement must be refused, are specified by Articles 34-35 and 45(1).
The exceptions under Articles 34-35 and 45(1) relate to judgments whose recognition is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the State addressed;
65 default judgments where the defendant was not served with the originating document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence; 66 certain judgments which are irreconcilable with other judgments; 67 and, in a very limited range of situations, judgments given in proceedings over which the original court lacked jurisdiction.
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As the European Court explained in Krombach v. Bamberski, 69 the publicpolicy proviso, established by Article 34(1), is confined to situations where recognition or enforcement of the judgment would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State addressed, inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State addressed, or of a right recognised as fundamental within that legal order. But it seems that such an infringement may either be procedural in character (for example, where a party has been denied an adequate opportunity to be heard), 70 or substantive in character (for example, where the court of origin has upheld and enforced a contract which, to the court addressed, would be vitiated (3), which applies where the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State addressed; and Article 34(4), which applies where the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in an external country, involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, and the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the State addressed. 68 Review by the court addressed of the jurisdiction of the court of origin is in general prohibited by Article 35(3). It is however permitted in certain exceptional cases by Article 35(1), 66 and 72. These exceptions relate to infringement of the provisions of Chapter II on insurance contracts, protected consumer contracts, and exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of subject-matter; to undertakings given in conventions, concluded before the entry into force of the Regulation, between a Member State and an external country; and to certain transitional situations. It is also available, by virtue of the ECJ's ruling in by improper pressure exerted in its conclusion). 71 Moreover the combined effect of Article 34(1), on public policy, and Article 34(2), on inadequate service, is to enable the court addressed to provide major safeguards in respect of a party's procedural right to be given a proper opportunity to be heard.
The Proposal
The Revision Proposal would greatly reduce the circumstances in which recognition and enforcement of a judgment from another Member State could be refused. The new Article 43 would retain the grounds for refusal based on irreconcilability with another judgment, and the new Article 83 would retain the provision for jurisdictional review in accordance with an old convention between the Member State addressed and an external country. But the Proposal would eliminate the other provisions for jurisdictional review, as well as the proviso in favour of the public policy of the State addressed.
As regards a party's procedural right to a proper opportunity to be heard, the Proposal would for the most part insist that a remedy be sought by way of review in the Member State of origin. The old Article 34(2), on inadequate service, would be eliminated, and the new Article 45 would instead confer an a defendant who had not entered an appearance in the Member State of origin a right to apply for a review of the judgment before the competent court of the State of origin. By Article 45(1), this right would be available where either: (a) he had not been served with the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence; or (b) he had been prevented from contesting the claim by reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part. In any event the right would be excluded if he had failed to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so.
By the new Article 45(2), the application for review would have to be submitted using the form set out in Annex II. By Article 45(3), it could be submitted directly to the competent court in the Member State of origin. Alternatively, it could be submitted to the competent court of the Member State of enforcement, and that court would then have to transfer the application without undue delay to the competent court in the Member State of origin. By Article 45(4), the application would have to be made promptly, and in any event within 45 days from the day on which the defendant had effectively been acquainted with the contents of the judgment and become able to react. Where the defendant applied for a review in the context of enforcement proceedings, the time period would run at the latest from the date of the first enforcement 71 Cf. Kaufman v. Gerson [1904] 1 KB 591, and Royal Boskalis v Mountain [1999] QB 674, on the public policy exception in the context of choice of the applicable law. measure which had the effect of making his property non-disposable in whole or in part. The application would be regarded as made when it was received by either of the relevant courts. By Article 45(5), if the application for a review were manifestly unfounded, the court would have to dismiss the application immediately, and in any event within 30 days from the receipt of the application. In that case the judgment would remain in force. If the court decided that a review was justified on one of the grounds laid down in Article 45(1), the judgment would become null and void. But the party who had obtained the judgment before the court of origin would not lose the benefits of the interruption of prescription or limitation periods acquired in the initial proceedings.
This right to review in the State of origin would be supplemented by a narrow right, conferred by the new Article 46, to apply to a court of the Member State of enforcement for refusal of recognition or enforcement. Such an application would be available where recognition or enforcement of the judgment would not be permitted by the fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial, but only in "cases other than those covered by Article 45" (on inadequate service or extraordinary obstacles to defence). By Article 46(2), the application would be brought before the court of the Member State of enforcement, listed in Annex III. By Article 46(3), the procedure for making the application would be governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement. By Article 46(4), if the application were manifestly unfounded, the court would have to dismiss the application immediately, and in any event within 30 days from the receipt of the application. By Article 46(5), if the court decided that the application was justified, recognition or enforcement of the judgment would be refused. By Article 46(6), a judgment given under Article 46 could be contested only by an appeal on a point of law under Annex IV. By Article 46(7), the court seised of an application under Article 46 would be able to stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal had been lodged against the judgment in the Member State of origin, or if the time for such an appeal had not yet expired. Where the time for such an appeal had not yet expired, the court could specify the time within which such an appeal was to be lodged. By Article 46(8), the unsuccessful party would bear the costs of the proceedings under Article 46, including the legal costs of the other party.
Some minor supplementary powers would be conferred on the competent authority in the Member State of enforcement by Article 44 of the Proposal. Article 44(1) would apply in the event of an application for a review pursuant to Articles 45 or 46. It would enable the competent authority in the Member State of enforcement, on application by the defendant: (a) to limit the enforcement proceedings to protective measures; (b) to make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it determined; or (c) to suspend, either wholly or in part, the enforcement of the judgment. By Article 44(2), on application by the defendant, the competent authority would have to suspend the enforcement of the judgment where its enforceability was suspended in the Member State of origin. By Article 44(3), where a protective measure had been ordered without the defendant having been summoned to appear, and enforced without prior service of the defendant, the competent authority could, on application by the defendant, suspend the enforcement if the defendant had challenged the measure in the Member State of origin.
The Zwiefka Report
In contrast to the Commission Proposal, the Zwiefka Report would retain the currently existing non-jurisdictional exceptions to recognition and enforcement, and the jurisdictional exception relating to consumer contracts. Its Amendment 34 would specify that a party would have the right to apply for a refusal of recognition or enforcement of a judgment in the four cases mentioned in Article 34 of the original version of the Brussels I Regulation (on public policy, inadequate service, and irreconcilability), and also where the judgment was given in breach of the requirements of Section 4 of Chapter II concerning jurisdiction over consumer contracts.
A note by the rapporteur sets out his view that exequatur should be abolished, but that a party should be able to challenge a decision in the Member State of recognition or enforcement, not only on fair trial grounds, but also on the ground that recognition or enforcement would be manifestly incompatible with the public policy of that Member State, and that consumers should be able to challenge enforcement in the country of enforcement because the court of origin had breached the requirements of Section 4 of Chapter II regarding jurisdiction over consumer contracts. His Explanatory Statement emphasises that he regards a public policy exception in respect of both substance and procedure as still necessary. To exclude substantive policy would be incompatible with Member States' international obligations and inconsistent with the exceptions contained in both the Rome I and Rome II Regulations for public policy and overriding mandatory provisions. A Member State before which the initial proceedings are brought is entitled to preserve its fundamental values; and this should equally be the case for a Member State in which the enforcement of a judgment is sought.
Some Comments
To the present writer, the Commission's enthusiasm to reduce almost to vanishing point the exceptions to recognition and enforcement under the Regulation amounts to a further step in the wrong direction. The Commission's determined rejection of the idea that a person whose activities are essentially local and small-scale needs and deserves bullet-proof protection from his local courts seems wilfully perverse.
To test the point, let us imagine an extreme case. A person of ordinary means, who is and has always been resident in France, and who is not engaged in international trade and has no connection whatever with any country other than France, is sued for a large sum, allegedly as the price of goods sold and delivered, in a court of a distant East European country (let us say, Romania). The plaintiff is a member of a criminal gang of extortioners. The claim, and every allegation made by the plaintiff in the Romanian proceedings, whether relevant to jurisdiction or to substance, are wholly false and fraudulent. No transaction as alleged, nor any other transaction with the plaintiff or having any connection with Romania, was ever entered into by the defendant, as the plaintiff well knew. The defendant's name and address were simply copied from a public register, and the instituting and other documents, which were served on the defendant by post, were in the Romanian language, and were unaccompanied by any translation. The defendant ignored these incomprehensible documents, and a default judgment was obtained from the Romanian court.
The Commission Proposal, by restricting the role of the courts of the State addressed, and in particular by eliminating the exceptions to recognition and enforcement by reference to the public policy of the State addressed and the inadequacy of the service of the instituting document, would make it harder for the French courts to refuse recognition and enforcement of the Romanian judgment. The defendant would be expected to apply to the Romanian court to have the judgment set aside.
Such an approach seems to the present writer to be wholly unacceptable. Admittedly the current version of the Regulation provides inadequate protection for defendants in scenarios such as this. A real improvement would be to strengthen, rather than weaken, the role of the courts of the country in which recognition or enforcement is sought. In particular, their powers to evaluate the proceedings leading to a default judgment, and to review the jurisdiction of the court of origin, should be greatly expanded.
E. Authentic Instruments and Court Settlements
The Revision Proposal would renumber the existing Article 57, on authentic instruments, as Article 70. The new provision would specify that an authentic instrument which is enforceable in one Member State must be enforced in the other Member States in the same way as judgments in accordance with Chapter III of the new Regulation. The public policy proviso would be eliminated. The instrument produced would have to satisfy the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity in the Member State of origin. The competent authority of the Member State of origin would have to issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate in the form set out in Annex V or VII, containing a summary of the enforceable obligation contained in the instrument.
The Proposal would also renumber the existing Article 58, on court settlements, as Article 71. The new Article 2(d) would define a court settlement as a settlement which had been approved by a court or concluded before a court in the course of proceedings; and Article 71 would specify that a court settlement which is enforceable in the Member State of origin must be enforced in the other Member States under the same conditions as authentic instruments. The competent court or authority of the Member State of origin would have to issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate in the form set out in Annex V, containing a summary of the agreement between the parties. The public policy proviso would again be eliminated.
F. Transitional Operation
In the Revision Proposal, the transitional operation of the new Regulation is dealt with by Article 77. By Article 77(1), the new Regulation would only apply to legal proceedings instituted and to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments after the date of its entry into application. Thus Chapter II of the new Regulation, on direct jurisdiction, would only apply to proceedings instituted after its commencement date. Jurisdiction over existing actions would continue to be governed by the original version of the Brussels I Regulation. Similarly Chapter III of the new Regulation would have full operation in respect of judgments given in proceedings instituted after its commencement date, and of authentic instruments drawn up or registered and court settlements approved or concluded after the commencement date.
But Article 77(2) would specify that legal proceedings instituted and documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments prior to the date of entry into application of the new Regulation would be governed by Sections 2 and 3 of Chapter III. This would apply to judgments given before the commencement date of the new Regulation, or given after the commencement date in proceedings instituted before the commencement date. It would subject the recognition and enforcement of such judgments to the same rules and procedures as would applicable under the new Regulation to new judgments in respect of the two exceptional types of claim (for defamation or invasion of privacy, or for compensation in collective proceedings). The same would apply to existing authentic instruments and court settlements.
In these transitional cases, it would still be necessary for enforcement to obtain a declaration of enforceability from a court of the State addressed, but the various modifications made in the regime applicable to cases where the requirement of exequatur is retained, such as the suppression of jurisdictional review (except in accordance with an old convention between the State addressed and an external country), would be operative. In contrast with Article 66(2)(b) of the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, there would be no provision for additional jurisdictional review in transitional cases, even in the case of judgments given at a time when, or judgments given in proceedings instituted at a time when, neither the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, nor any version of the Brussels or Lugano Conventions, had entered into force between the State of origin and the State addressed. Despite this, Article 81(2) would, somewhat puzzlingly, continue the operation of the otherwise largely superceded bilateral conventions between Member States in relation to judgments given before 1st March 2002, the date on which the original version of the Brussels I Regulation had initially entered into force between fourteen Member States.
V. ARBITRATION
A. The Current Position
In the original version of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 1 (2) 77 Articles 27-30 of the Regulation, on concurrent actions, do not apply where a court of a Member State is seised of a proceeding to which Article 1(2)(d) applies, such as an application for a declaration as to the validity of an arbitration agreement, after a court of another Member State has been seised of an action for determination of the substantive dispute in defiance of the arbitration agreement.
In Van Uden, the European Court accepted that a valid arbitration agreement has the effect of excluding the substantive jurisdiction of all courts to determine the merits of a dispute under Articles 2 and 5-24 of the Brussels I Regulation. On the other hand, as the European Court explained in Allianz, the Regulation does apply where a court of a Member State is seised of an action on the merits, but the defendant requests it to decline jurisdiction in order to give effect to an arbitration agreement (perhaps invoking Article II of the New York Convention). For in this situation the principal subject-matter of the judicial proceedings is the substantive claim, and the validity and effect of the arbitration clause is merely an incidental issue. Thus if the court seised holds (even erroneously) that the arbitration agreement relied on is invalid or ineffective, and therefore proceeds to accept jurisdiction and to determine the substantive claim, its decision on the substantive claim qualifies for recognition and enforcement in the other Member States under Chapter III of the Regulation. For the validity and effect of the arbitration agreement constituted only a preliminary issue, and one which was relevant only to the jurisdiction of the original court, and Article 35 of the Regulation prevents review of the jurisdiction of the original court by the court addressed.
It also seems reasonably clear from the reasoning of the European Court in Allianz that the same applies where the original court, seised in defiance of an alleged arbitration agreement, has merely made a decision accepting jurisdiction on the ground that the agreement is invalid or ineffective, and has not yet proceeded to determine the substantive claim. The courts of the other Member States must accord recognition under Chapter III of the Regulation to the decision that the agreement is invalid or ineffective. For Chapter III extends to interlocutory decisions, and it requires incidental recognition to be accorded by the courts of a Member State to a judgment given in another Member State in all proceedings in which the decision is relevant, including proceedings which are themselves otherwise excluded from the scope of the Regulation by Article 1(2). Unfortunately in this scenario a contrary view is at present adopted by the English courts.
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In any event the ruling of the European Court in Allianz has established that it is incompatible with the Brussels I Regulation for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings before the courts of another Member State in respect of a dispute concerning a matter which falls within the scope of the Regulation, on the ground that such proceedings would be contrary to an arbitration agreement.
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The European Court accepted that proceedings based on an arbitration clause and giving rise to an anti-suit injunction were outside the scope of the Brussels I Regulation, since their subject-matter and the rights which they served to protect were covered by the exclusion for arbitration. Nonetheless the European Court explained that such proceedings had consequences which undermined the effectiveness of the Regulation, by preventing a court of another Member State from exercising the jurisdiction conferred on it by the Regulation. For the action on the merits fell within the Regulation, and consequently a preliminary issue concerning the applicability of an arbitration agreement, raised as an incidental question to contest the jurisdiction of the court seised of that action, also fell within its scope, 80 and it was therefore exclusively for that court to rule on that objection and on its own jurisdiction, pursuant to the Regulation.
B. The Revision Proposal of 2010
The Revision Proposal envisages the addition of a provision dealing with the concurrence of arbitration proceedings and judicial proceedings. Thus the exclusion of arbitration by Article 1(2)(d) would be subjected to an exception specified by the new Articles 29(4) and 33(3). was contested on the basis of an arbitration agreement. In such a case, once either the courts of the Member State of the seat, or the arbitral tribunal, had been seised of proceedings to determine, either as their main object or as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement, Article 29(4)(a) would require the courts of the other Member State to stay their proceedings. Article 29(4)(b) would add that in this situation the court whose jurisdiction was contested would retain power to decline jurisdiction if its national law so prescribed. Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration agreement had been established, Article 29(4)(c) would require the court seised to decline jurisdiction. By Article 29(4)(d), these provisions would not apply in disputes concerning an insurance contract, a protected consumer contract, or an individual employment contract. In addition, the new Article 33(3) would specify that for this purpose an arbitral tribunal would be regarded as seised when a party had nominated an arbitrator, or when a party had requested the support of an institution, authority or court for the tribunal's constitution.
Thus the arbitral tribunal, and the courts of the seat, would be given priority in determining the validity and effect of the arbitration clause, even if proceedings on the merits in a court of another Member State were commenced before the proceedings in the Member State of the seat.
These new provisions may prove controversial. They are strongly opposed by the Zwiefka Report. Its proposed Amendments 1, 5, 10 and 24-25 would widen (rather than narrow) the scope of the exclusion of arbitration. These Amendments would make Article 1(2)(d) of the new Regulation exclude from its scope "arbitration, including judicial procedures ruling on the validity or extent of arbitral competence as a principal issue or as an incidental or preliminary question". They would also make Recital 11 specify that the Regulation "does not apply to arbitration. In particular, it does not apply to the form, existence, validity or effects of arbitration agreements, the powers of the arbitrators, the procedure before arbitral tribunals, and the validity, annulment, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The whole matter of arbitration should be excluded from the scope of this Regulation. Consequently, this Regulation does not apply to any dispute, litigation or application which the parties have subjected to an arbitration agreement or settlement or which relates to arbitration by virtue of an international treaty. Likewise, this Regulation does not apply to any dispute or decision concerning the existence or validity of an arbitration agreement or settlement, or to any provisional or preventive measure adopted in the context of a dispute, litigation or application which the parties have subjected to an arbitration agreement or settlement or which relates to arbitration by virtue of an international treaty." In his Explanatory Statement, the rapporteur argues that "arbitration is satisfactorily dealt with by the 1958 New York Convention and the 1961 Geneva Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. All Member States are parties to the above mentioned conventions; therefore the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Regulation should be preserved."
To the present writer, the Commission's Proposal to give priority to a decision of the arbitral tribunal or the courts of the seat as to the validity or effect of an alleged arbitration agreement is unwelcome. It seems to be based on a presumption of validity, which goes beyond the provisions of by the New York Convention 1958. The alternative offered by the Zwiefka Report, which seems to envisage wholly removing from the scope of the Regulation any dispute which a party alleges to be covered by an arbitration agreement, may be viewed as bordering on the absurd.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be suggested that, as regards direct jurisdiction, the main feature of the Revision Proposal of 2010, comprising the assimilation of the treatment of external defendants to that of internal defendants, deserves an enthusiastic welcome. Other changes proposed in the sphere of direct jurisdiction may be regarded as variable in quality. But, as regards the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the proposed changes amount to major steps in entirely the wrong direction.
